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Review Essay

Whipping Up a Storm: Trying to Make
Sense of Constitutional Law
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON1

Fidelity and Constraint: How the
Supreme Court Has Read the American
Constitution, by Lawrence Lessig2
The effort to make sense out of what the judges of any Supreme Court do is all the more
pressing and acute in times of political turbulence. Lawrence Lessig’s Fidelity and Constraint
offers itself as one such effort to distinguish constitutional decision-making from “the ad
hoc in politics” by its reliance upon principled and neutral reasons; it is the judges’ detached
and professional nature that underwrites their democratic legitimacy and institutional
commitment. This review challenges those claims and demonstrates how Lessig’s analysis
does more to undermine that project than achieve it.

TRYING TO MAKE SENSE out of what the judges of any Supreme Court do is an

enduring preoccupation of lawyers and jurists. This is especially so in the United
States. This is no mere academic indulgence as the Court’s work has a deep and
lasting impact on many aspects of the American polity and society. Whether
by way of grand theorizing or through case-by-case criticisms, academics and
1.

2.

Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am grateful
to Richard Albert, Ben Berger, Richard Devlin, Richard Haigh, Jennifer Leitch, Thomas
Lundmark, Mark Tushnet, and other friends and colleagues for critical assistance and
intellectual support.
(Oxford University Press, 2019) 581 [Lessig].
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commentators have sought to understand and handle the tensions between power
and principle, politics and personnel, tradition and change, and much else in the
work of the Court. Of course, this challenge is all the more pressing and acute
in times of political turbulence; the age of Trump has exacerbated an already
difficult and divisive issue. In such contemporary circumstances, therefore, for
good and bad, the appointment and performance of the Supreme Court’s nine
justices are thrust further into the critical spotlight; their credentials and their
bona fides are subject to even greater scrutiny and pressure from both inside and
outside the academy.
Occasioned by the fragile democratic legitimacy of the Supreme Court,
Herbert Wechsler’s challenge still casts a long shadow over those presuming to
explain the apparent mysteries of Supreme Court decision-making in modern
constitutional law—to demonstrate how judges perform their task in a way that
is distinguishable from “the ad hoc in politics” by their reliance upon principled
reasons that “in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate
result that is involved.”3 And, it might be added, transcending any immediate
political agenda that is involved. Lawrence Lessig places himself squarely with
this Wechsler camp. For him, it is the judges’ detached and professional nature
that underwrites their democratic legitimacy and institutional commitment:
They can engage with ideological politics, but not be consumed or captured by
it. Fidelity and Constraint is devoted to accomplishing this delicate and difficult
task as a matter of both historical practice as well as normative imperative.

I. LESSIG IS MORE
It is to Lawrence Lessig’s credit that he has entered this hectic fray and taken
on the daunting challenge of explaining the wiles and workings of the Supreme
Court. But, as anyone familiar with Lessig’s other writings know, his intervention
is guaranteed to be as ambitious and challenging as it is disconcerting and
disturbing. In this regard, Fidelity and Constraint does not disappoint. It is a
no half-measures and no-stone-unturned work of enormous erudition, sparkling
insight, and provocative apercus. While it is conversational and relaxed in style
and presentation, it is far from conventional or casual in its approach and
conclusions. In revisiting the received wisdom on the history of constitutional
law, he rewrites it. After reading Fidelity and Constraint, that history will not be
3.

Herbert Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law” (1959) 73 Harv
L Rev 1 at 15, 19. For the best survey of the different approaches, see Thomas E Baker,
“Constitutional Theory in a Nutshell” (2004) 13 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J.
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viewed or understood in the same way again. With its broad sweep and nuanced
depth, it is likely as close to a jurisprudential page-turner as you could hope to
read. Lessig can both soar with the theoretical eagles and get his hands dirty
with the practical grubs. If “administrative law is not for cissies,”4 then Lessigian
constitutional law is only for those who can stomach high-risk thrills and spills
in the hope of experiencing some kind of intellectual apotheosis. It is a genuinely
provocative performance by a singular talent.
That said, if you fly as high and as far as Lessig does, you are likely to crash
and burn on more than one occasion. That is certainly the case in this book: His
admirable refusal to play it safe ensures some spectacular flame-outs. However,
that is not at all the main problem with his iconoclastic (or, to use one of Lessig’s
own colourful terms, “funky”)5 approach to constitutional law and history. His
self-imposed mission is to “provide an account that fits the data—the decisions
by the US Supreme Court—while justifying the practice these data reveal.”6 Or,
less formally, he offers a critical look at “the game we’ve been playing so far.”7
In performing this unashamedly apologetic task, he treats judges as professional
and principled officials, not as politicians in robes or “party hacks.”8 Indeed,
a major part of his explanatory endeavour is to demonstrate that it is not only
possible, but also has been the case that the Supreme Court has performed its
work in a legitimate, predictable, and defensible way when looked at from his
account’s point of view: “[T]he judge’s decision is based … upon law, … [not]
upon politics (or craziness).”9
Yet, as I read it, Lessig’s powerful probing and reading of the American
tradition of constitutional law produces exactly the opposite result—he provides
a cogent and compelling argument that the work of the Supreme Court can be
best understood and defended as an exercise in almost self-conscious political
decision making. Once his unnecessarily narrow notion of what “politics” entails
is developed and expanded, it becomes obvious and undeniable that the historical
arc of constitutional adjudication and doctrine is significantly driven and defined
by the dynamic forces of the informing political context. While the Supreme
Court’s decisions might not follow the nation’s electoral returns, nor are its judges

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Antonin Scalia, “Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law” [1989]
Duke LJ 511 at 511.
Lessig, supra note 2 at 38.
Ibid at 2.
Ibid at 4.
Ibid.
Ibid at 17.
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considered “party hacks,”10 he argues that they never stray far from conventional
political views or go against society’s extant deep-seated political commitments
(for both good and bad). They might sometimes be slightly behind or ahead of
these trends, but not by much. Except for the die-hard formalist, this is hardly
surprising. But for Lessig and others like him, this presents a confounding
challenge. For all the huff and puff of constitutional jurists and judges, it is not
the text, context, interpretive strategy, or judicial role that energizes the twist and
turns of constitutional doctrine, but its larger ideological framing at the time
of its shaping and dependence—constitutional adjudication and doctrine is a
mode of politics.
In this review, therefore, I will first provide the most charitable and faithful
summary of Lessig’s account. After that, I will unpack it in more critical ways
and turn the tables on Lessig. Rather than accept the force of his analysis and go
along with his contention that to deny the reality of the constraints that operate
on the Supreme Court is “to spit in the wind of what we all know is true,”11
I will show that it is Lessig himself who has whipped up a hostile jurisprudential
storm and tried to spit in its face. Throughout the review, my ambition is not
to grapple with the detailed accuracy or fairness of Lessig’s historical accounts
of individual cases or lines of doctrine: I leave that to those more qualified to
judge and contest. My focus is upon the jurisprudential appeal, validity, overall
sweep, and import of his account about the apparent constraints that demand
and anchor Supreme Court judges’ fidelity to the Constitution. Insofar as they
exist, they are political in nature and effect.

II. BLOWING IN THE WIND
Lessig offers “a kind of econometrics brought to constitutional theory.”12
In an unexpected evocation of the late Ronald Dworkin,13 he offers his account
of the American constitutional tradition and legal doctrine as “a story that makes

10.
11.
12.
13.

Ibid at 4.
Ibid at 416.
Ibid at 2.
See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986). It is a surprising
reference as Lessig is adamant that he is not involved in offering a moral or prescriptive
reading of the Constitution. The other two constitutional theorists that he commends are his
Harvard colleagues, Cass R Sunstein and Richard Fallon. See Cass R Sunstein, Constitutional
Personae: Heroes, Soldiers, Minimalists, and Mutes (Oxford University Press, 2015); Richard H
Fallon, Jr, Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court (Harvard University Press, 2018).
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the most of the practice that we’re trying to understand.”14 Although he can be
a little preachy at times, he does have the knack of telling a good story. Fidelity
and Constraint is an appetizing, if daunting prospect. But he is not content to
tell us what has been happening. He also suggests that, in making “the most”
of it, he will be defending and justifying that practice as well. In telling this kind
of story, Lessig seeks to tread a very thin line. He does not claim to provide a
playbook for what judges should do or to establish moral or political standards
against which to judge their decisions. What he does do is explain what the
Supreme Court has been doing and put forward a defence of that historical
practice. This is a tall order as much of the Supreme Court’s performance over
the years has not always been uplifting or stellar. Indeed, many agree that it has
been downright bad and embarrassing at times.
As the title of his book suggests, Lessig maintains that Supreme Court judges
do and should fulfill their judicial responsibilities by following “the practice of
interpretive fidelity.”15 In fleshing out this effort and traversing vast swathes of
constitutional doctrine, he is in an extended and thinly veiled conversation with
two of his main mentors, both Justice Antonin Scalia (for whom he clerked)
and Professor Bruce Ackerman (with whom he was a student).16 Although he
ultimately rejects the ideas and proposals of both, Lessig’s own account bears
all the hallmarks of these two towering figures on the constitutional landscape;
he offers important tweaks of both their work rather than an outright dismissal
of them. As such, Fidelity and Constraint builds upon and advances many familiar
motifs and tropes of contemporary constitutional theory. In particular, he looks
to resist any particular pigeon-holing and claims that his account can make
sense of both legal doctrine and jurisprudential insights on the political Right
and Left. Lessig relies upon two primary tools or practices at work—meaning
fidelity and role fidelity. The former draws upon the originalist tendency in legal
hermeneutics and the latter draws on the institutional consideration of political
science. Neither of these is new in either use or exposition; it is the way that they
interact that gives his account its distinctive and original character.
In order to grasp the idea of meaning fidelity, Lessig works with a Scalian
one-step originalism, but supplements it with a more creative second step. While
traditional originalists ask themselves what the words of a particular constitutional
14. Lessig, supra note 2 at 422.
15. Ibid at 18.
16. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (West
Group, 2012); Bruce A Ackerman, We the People, vols 1-3 (Harvard University Press,
1991, 1998, 2014).
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text mean, his neo-version asks how that text might be applied purposefully
to a changed context. This, of course, can result in some varied and different
renderings across and over time. For him, as he demonstrates in his colourful
tour through the search and seizure doctrine,17 blind adherence to a text can be
as wrong-headed and mistaken as a novel or even “aggressive” interpretation can
be illuminating and valid.18 More to the point, creative translation can actually
be more faithful to the original. For him, this kind of inspired judicial work is
not at all an act of betrayal, but is more fruitfully understood as a renewal in
the name of preservation: It remains faithful to the text’s original meaning, not
only its words.19 Throughout Fidelity and Constraint, Lessig provides rich and
subtle accounts of how Supreme Court judges have gone about their translating
task in this sophisticated, originalist mode of interpretation.20 Indeed, it turns
out that the originalist Scalia is the exception not the rule, even within the
originalist canon.
Role fidelity operates along with meaning fidelity in the Lessigian
constitutional order. By this, he intends to draw attention to how the Supreme
Court has to recognize and respect its institutional limitations within a broader
scheme of democratic governance. It is not for courts to usurp or trample on
territory that is more appropriately trodden by the executive and legislative
branches of government. For example, in the Constitution’s early days, Chief
Justice Marshall solidified the Supreme Court’s role with an act of strategic
“brilliance” in Marbury v Madison.21 By “bending” and “dissembling”22 the law,
he committed “a sin,” but “a beautiful sin.”23 Similarly, in the 1930s, when the
Supreme Court came under enormous presidential and popular pressure to change
its jurisprudential tack,24 the judges took a similar institutional approach to that
of Marshall, only this time it was done to preserve the Court’s role, not to establish
it. As Lessig points out, “getting it right is important, but appearing non-political
can be much more important”:25 There are occasions where the Supreme Court
has given constitutional substance a back seat to institutional survival.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Lessig, supra note 2 at 259-70.
Ibid at 255.
See generally Jack Balkin, Living Originalism (Harvard University Press, 2011).
Lessig, supra note 2 at 49-69.
Ibid at 32, discussing Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Lessig, supra note 2 at 33, 43.
Ibid at 33.
Ibid at 160-72.
Ibid at 213.
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However, the heart of Lessig’s account is to be found in the way in which
these two imperatives play off each other in a creative and sustaining tension:
“[W]e can understand the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine as the product
of the interaction between these two fidelities.”26 There is nothing innately
conservative or progressive about how this has played out. Sometimes, role fidelity
has compromised the obligation to pursue meaning fidelity as in recent efforts to
turn back Roe v Wade.27 At other times, meaning fidelity has pushed the Court
to act at the limits of its institutional competence and occasionally beyond them,
as in Griswold v Connecticut.28 Indeed, Lessig is at his very best when he goes deep
into in the historical thickets of constitutional doctrine to capture and describe
this dynamic interaction. For instance, his evolutionary account of due process
rulings from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century is an
extended virtuoso performance that dances its way to stunning analytical effect
over the ebb and flow of government regulation and its political underpinning.29
In particular, he is entirely enlightening and convincing in showing how the
Supreme Court shifted back and forth in its work between the pushes of meaning
and the pulls of role in maintaining its overall constitutional faith. Accordingly,
the history of legal doctrine has often been “the story of translations attempted,
and then constraints of role realized.”30
As edifying as that account is, Lessig recognizes that, if he is to justify and
not simply describe the pace and pattern of these doctrinal manoeuvres, he must
pull back the curtain and look more keenly at the off-stage dynamics of the
shifting constitutional and political contexts. After all, to justify the “separate, but
equal”31 decades as being not only understandable, but acceptable is no easy feat.
He does this by going beyond the internal workings of the Court and looking to
the external context and forces within which the Court operates. For him, this
entails an appreciation for the fact that “the Constitution gets read against the
background of the dominant ideas of any age.”32 He insists that the work of the
Supreme Court must be understood and appreciated in terms of prevailing values
and commitments: He terms these as factual or reality-based constraints on the
Court. To expect the Supreme Court to ignore or side-step these Holmesian

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Ibid at 71.
Ibid at 397-401, discussing Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
Ibid at 392-94, discussing Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
Ibid at 95-136.
Ibid at 232.
Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537 at 552 (1896) [Plessy].
Lessig, supra note 2 at 442.
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“felt necessities of the time”33 would be tantamount to expecting the Court “to
spit into the wind of what everyone knows is true, whether or not that ‘truth’
conforms to what the framers might have thought.”34 Lessig commits himself to
an account of the period between Plessy v Ferguson35 in 1896, to Brown v Board
of Education36 in 1954, that acknowledges that racism was a fact of social life that
the Supreme Court and its “normal judges” simply took for granted,37 no matter
how reprehensible it may seem to later and more modern sensibilities:38
The social and political context is thus a constraint on constitutionalism. It is
also a feature of constitutionalism, not a bug. It is an ongoing assurance that the
Constitution will not become too remote. The key is to get help on any theory that
treats context as compromise or an error, and instead build a theory that places
context right in the middle.

Accordingly, with this combination of internal and external constraints,
Lessig defends the overall thrust and merit of his account by reference to its
ultimately democratic character—if the Supreme Court were to abandon its
practice of fidelity, it would disrupt the delicate balance of democratic powers
and responsibilities: “[T]o the extent that propriety will be measured against the
background of … public meaning, if the Court deviates from this background
understanding, it risks its own institutional standing.”39 In this way, according
to him, the Supreme Court’s practice of interpretive fidelity in both role and
meaning can not only be accurately explained, but also convincingly justified.
These are powerful and provocative claims; they warrant sustained attention and
critical evaluation. After offering a more searching examination of his claim that
“the judge’s decision is based … upon law …, [not] upon politics (or craziness),”40
I will challenge his view that these judicial practices, no matter how accurately
described, can be defended as legitimate and justified.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

OW Holmes, Jr, The Common Law (Little, Brown, 1881) at 1.
Lessig, supra note 2 at 232.
Plessy, supra note 31.
347 US 483 (1954).
Lessig, supra note 2 at 344-60.
Ibid at 456.
Ibid at 351. The argument here is similar to Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How
Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution
(Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, 2009).
40. Lessig, supra note 2 at 17.
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III. SPITTING IN THE WIND
There is a somewhat baffling progress to Lessig’s central argument. Although he
begins with the self-imposed task of demonstrating that the Supreme Court can
and does do its job as something separate and apart from politics, he ends Fidelity
and Constraint with the clear admission that Supreme Court judges can and do
engage in a profoundly political process when they craft their judgments and
decisions. It is a long and winding road between “the judge’s decision is based …
upon law …, [not] upon politics (or craziness)”41 and “the Constitution gets read
against the background of the dominant ideas of any age.”42 As the old saw has
it, it is difficult, if not impossible, for Lessig to get where he is going from where
he starts. The critical challenge is to explain this crucial shift and its significance
for his account.
The crucial issue for explaining this lies with the meaning of “politics.”
Whether the Supreme Court’s work is or is not political depends upon what
is meant by that term. Almost all agree that legal cases arise in socio-political
contexts and that their resolution has an impact on those socio-political
contexts.43 However, the mainstream view is that the Supreme Court’s actual
judgment giving and decision making can be done healthily removed from those
contexts. Few contend that there is no connection between decision and context;
the disagreement is over the extent of that insulation or immersion. Lessig
leans very much towards the insulation end of the jurisprudential spectrum.
Throughout his account, he is adamant that judges do not act as “party hacks”
or partisan[s].”44 But this is a very limited understanding of politics; there is more
to politics than adherence to a Republican or Democratic party line and even
that is far from uniform, let alone the same. Indeed, the explanation for Lessig’s
apparent switch can be found in an expansive and more convincing grasp of what
the claim that “law is politics” is about. Those who adopt such a stance, like me,45
treat the Republican–Democrat split as a shallower and narrower segment of a
much deeper and broader continuum. So understood, it brings Lessig well within
the “law is politics” fold.
Lessig draws some important distinctions about the role of social values,
political norms and ideological alignments in the adjudicative enterprise. One
is that between contested issues “that normal people think normal people can
disagree about” and uncontested issues that “normal people think normal
people don’t disagree about.”46 He notes that something is contested not because
“people, on average or frequently, contest it [but] … because within a particular
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social context, people understand that normal people can disagree about it.”47
For him, therefore, “normal” simply means mainstream—if you do disagree on
some issues, then you are not normal and are outside the mainstream. So, while
Republicans and Democrats are normal, presumably socialists and fascists are not.
Of course, across time, what falls into the contested and uncontested boxes will
change. While it was uncontested at the time of Plessy in 1896 that segregation
was acceptable, this notion had switched around and become contested by the
time of Brown in 1954.
Another important distinction for Lessig is that between foregrounded and
backgrounded issues. Whereas the former are things that are presently talked
about, the latter are not. In short, this is shorthand for tracking and describing
“the activity of current social discourse.”48 Again, what is in each box will
change over time. So, today, abortion is foregrounded and contentious, but
sexual harassment is foregrounded and uncontested. On the other hand, while
infanticide is backgrounded and uncontested, gay rights, at least in the 1970s,
were backgrounded and contested. Taken together, these two distinctions do
considerable work in grounding and defending Lessig’s account of Supreme
Court judging and doctrine over the years. Indeed, they are the key to unlocking
his claim that “law is not politics.”
For Lessig, constitutional judging takes place on the ground of these
uncontested and backgrounded issues. He argues that these “social meanings
are facts” and are simply taken-for-granted.49 As such, they not only require
no argument in their defence, but also mark anyone who does contest them as
outside the pale of serious attention. Importantly, the “normal judge,” like the
normal person, will rely on these social facts, consciously or not. So, in going
about their work, the normal judge will “fit in” with and become “well-adapted”
to the prevailing social discourse and understandings around the issue to be
adjudicated.50 In other words, they will not contest the presently uncontested or
foreground what is presently backgrounded. Lessig hangs much of his account’s
plausibility and cogency on the indubitable constraint of these social facts:51
Always the Court—including every justice—has yielded to “what we now
understand” …. Democracy operates subject to certain constraints. The Constitution
is one constraint. Reality is another. “What we now understand” … has formed a

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Ibid at 145-46.
Ibid at 146.
Ibid at 446.
Ibid at 154.
Ibid at 420.
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critical constraint on the evolution of the Supreme Court’s doctrine. As ideas get
thrown up for grabs, the Court’s readings of the Constitution changes …. Those
changes are not simply politics. They are not simply the political preferences of
a legal elite. They are a reality—one that the legal elite processes differently from
the public, no doubt. But they are part of a social reality that our Constitution is
subject to.

There is so much here that needs to be unpacked and held up for criticism.
There may well be certain “realities” that operate on everyone’s mind, but it is
difficult to view them as monolithic and fixed at any one point in time. As Lessig
concedes, change occurs. But that change is not en bloc: The status quo or “what
we now understand” is always on the move and is rarely as integrated as Lessig
suggests. In a manner of speaking, it is always evolving in that the later reality
grows out of the existing reality; the beginnings of the next era are in play, albeit
barely and marginally, in the present era. So, again as regards racism, while the
racist attitudes that generated and sustained Plessy-like views were dominant,
they were not wall-to-wall or unchallenged; black Americans and their white
allies (as Justice Harlan’s famous and sole dissent revealed)52 were not part of that
social consensus. Moreover, as elite and powerful actors, Supreme Court judges
were not beholden to such views, except as it either appealed to them or suited
their need to preserve their institutional power. As such, although judges are part
of the existing social fabric, they are also weavers and preservers of that fabric;
they cannot absolve themselves of responsibility for maintaining racist or other
oppressive attitudes and practices.
The upshot is that, while Supreme Court judges might not simply legislate
their own Republican or Democratic preferences,53 they are influenced and driven
by the larger socio-political views and forces in play. The very act of recognizing
and identifying the contours of “current social discourse”54 and that “social and
political context inevitably and appropriately plays a significant role”55 is profoundly
political in that it involves choice and responsibility among contested alternatives
about power and position in society; there is no uncontroversial or neutral way
to fix that context with sufficient operational certainty. The only difference
between contested and uncontested issues is not whether they are factual or not:
52. Plessy, supra note 31 at 552-64.
53. It might well be that only the academic elite are sufficiently naïve to believe this. The recent
shenanigans over the appointment of Supreme Court judges, like Neil Gorsuch and Brett
Kavanaugh, suggest that the political elite and the public generally realize full well the
political role and performance of the Supreme Court.
54. Lessig, supra note 2 at 146.
55. Ibid at 454 [emphasis in original].
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it is the visibility of each. Both are political and, therefore, not factual in the
sense of having an indisputable there-ness. The uncontested are as political as
the contested in that they represent always changing and, therefore, unreal or
un-factual ideas; they both function at different levels of social acceptability and
embeddedness. Lessig recognizes that when he observes that the Supreme Court’s
work can be explained as “tracking the dynamic of an evolving social meaning”
and that “as [social] understanding changes, the [constitutional] doctrine gets
translated to track that change.”56
Although Lessig wants to pretend otherwise, Supreme Court judges are
not as constrained as he claims they are or as his account demands if it is to
be persuasive. Both “reality” and “the Constitution” are not things that operate
entirely outside the realm of judicial choice, but are largely inside it. It is simply
unconvincing to assert that judges act appropriately when they acknowledge the
reality of social understandings and display because they “cannot spit into the wind
of what everyone knows is true, whether or not that ‘truth’ conforms to what the
framers might have thought.”57 This kind of “truth” signifies less a constraint, but
more a felt necessity that only has obligatory force in the there-and-then; it has
no free-standing moral or political pull outside of its informing and immediate
social context. Accordingly, Lessig’s claim that “the Constitution gets read against
the background of the dominant ideas of any age” is an acceptance, not an
abandonment of the notion that the judicial development of constitutional law
is at bottom a deeply and inescapably political process.58 If anyone is spitting in
the wind, it is Lessig himself.

56. Ibid at 372, 375.
57. Ibid at 232.
58. Ibid at 442.
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IV. FLAPPING IN THE WIND
It is not only the larger political thrust of Lessig’s overall account that is based
on politics. Even its more local and day-to-day understanding of what judges
are doing and are supposed to be doing is infused with a deep political character
and colouring. Following the dictates of meaning fidelity and role fidelity is not
the straightforward or non-political task that Lessig imagines or portrays it to
be. Indeed, the whole case-by-case practice of constitutional adjudication is less
technical and professional and more political and contestable than it is conceded.
As a neo-originalist, Lessig runs into many of the problems that accompany
any mode of originalist interpretation—variable historical records; shifting
discursive meanings; intransigent collective intent; disparate worldviews; and
the like.59 Indeed, his two-step approach to meaning fidelity seems to throw in
a few extra difficulties for good measure. If it is taxing to locate the original
intention behind the Constitution or the original public understanding of the
Constitution’s text, it is no less demanding to capture the contemporary zeitgeist
with any degree of confidence. Furthermore, once you add these two demanding
practices together, it becomes beyond the grasp of even a super-human judge, let
alone any “normal” judge. Consequently, despite the originalists’ claims to offer
a viable escape from the tendency for judges (and jurists) to turn constitutional
interpretation into a vehicle for ideological advocacy, the neo-originalists hide
more than they reveal; there is a whiff of the mystical and mysterious about their
craft. While there is nothing about the idea or practice of “textual translation” that
is necessarily ideological (as it can be done by both Right and Left to serve their
own ends), its performance in particular practical settings cannot be achieved
without taking a stand on particular and divisive political issues and ideas.
Lessig’s account of meaning fidelity is so open-ended as to be almost vacuous.
For him, under the rubric of “translation,” it would seem that two judges can
reach entirely opposite understandings about the original meaning of a textual
provision and its application to modern circumstances, but each be accredited
with being faithful to the Constitution. This defies any serious defence, especially
when such a justification is done under the name of constitutional constraint.
This is exactly what happened in the Citizens United v Federal Election Commission
case in 2010.60 Both Justice Stevens’ dissent (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer,
and Sotomayor) and Justice Scalia’s concurrence (joined by Justice Alito and,
59. See Allan C Hutchinson, Toward an Informal Account of Legal Interpretation (Cambridge
University Press, 2016) ch 5.
60. 558 US 310 (2010).
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in part, by Justice Thomas) claimed to be taking an originalist approach; the
former emphasized that the framers did not have corporations in mind when
they guaranteed the right to free speech, whereas the latter argued that there was
no historical evidence that the framers contemplated that the government could
restrict the political speech of business corporations.61 Assuming good faith on
each side, the tie-breaker was more likely not interpretive authenticity, but rather
ideological resonance. As such, Lessig comes very close to preaching legal theory,
but condoning political ideology.
When it comes to role fidelity, the political character of this device is even
more obvious. The basic Lessigian move seems to be that while judges are and
should generally be faithful to the Constitution’s meaning and “decide cases
correctly,” they can deviate or abandon that meaning and obligation when role
fidelity so demands.62 This will be the case even if they sometimes have to decide
“in one way, even though [they] believe they would decide it differently if they
didn’t need to worry about the institutional costs to the court.”63 It is difficult to
appreciate how this balancing of interpretive fidelity and institutional propriety
can be accomplished without engaging in a similar kind of calculation that
politicians make and without drawing upon some politically embedded standard
of what will and will not fly from the public’s point of view. It puts appearance
and affect above substance and candour.
Examples of this abound in Fidelity and Constraint. Two examples will
suffice. Lessig’s treatment of the foundational Marbury judgment sets the tone for
later evaluations. He praises it for its strategic “brilliance” not its legal quality.64
In “bending” and “dissembling”65 the Constitution (and, thereby, establishing
the institution of judicial review), he holds that Marshall committed “a sin,”
but “a beautiful sin.”66 If this kind of rhetorical success and role building is not
a quintessential political act and achievement, it is hard to know what would
be. Again, the Supreme Court’s judgment in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v Casey67 and its reluctant refusal to overturn Roe shows how role
fidelity has been used to eclipse meaning fidelity.68 Although the Supreme Court
judges were divided on what meaning fidelity demanded, they were relatively
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
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united on the fact that institutional protection was more important than
interpretive honesty. None of this is to suggest that such a calculation is inherently
bad. However, it ill behooves a theorist, like Lessig, to run this argument in the
name of demonstrating that the Court is not political: “[F]idelity to role forces
the court to compromise on fidelity to meaning.”69
Accordingly, although claiming to offer a distinctive and defensible
account of constitutional history and doctrine, Lessig has to shave his theory
so thin to explain all the twists and turns of constitutional doctrine that it
becomes insubstantial. It can only encompass all by encompassing anything
and everything: The constraints of meaning and role become so flexible and so
loose that they lose any critical bite. The materials of constitutional law are so
capacious and amorphous that almost anything short of outright manipulation
or lying is acceptable. After all, if the judgments and decisions of Justices Scalia
and Thomas, as well as Justices Marshall and Brennan are each and all legitimate,
then Lessig’s account of constitutional doctrine has little to tell us or recommend.
Fidelity turns about to be an easy virtue that places no real constraints on what
constitutional judges can and cannot do and should and should not do. Indeed,
looking at the constitutional world through a Lessigian lens, it is difficult to
envisage what would count as playing fast-and-loose or being unfaithful.
In so many ways, he leaves judges and jurists flapping in the political wind.

V. BLOWING IN THE WIND
So what is the upshot of re-casting Lessig’s account as more accurately one that
explains how the Supreme Court’s development of constitutional doctrine,
as a matter of pace and substance, is driven and sustained by politics? And what
follows if it is accepted, as he phrases it, that “‘what we now understand’ … has
formed a critical constraint on the evolution of the Supreme Court’s doctrine”?70
These are important questions that deserve some serious answers. The tone
of Lessig’s responses seems to be premised on the overriding fear that, if the
Supreme Court is understood as being engaged in politics, the whole system of
democratic governance “and the character of the court as a judicial body” will be
under threat.71 This is a false and unnecessary assumption.
To begin with, it is not at all clear why Lessig feels the analytical compulsion
to offer a theory that not only provides “an account that fits the data,” but also
69. Ibid at 256.
70. Ibid at 420.
71. Ibid at 455.
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serves to justify “the practice these data reveal.”72 His project commits him not
only to incorporate irredeemable cases like Plessy and United States v Cruikshank73
into his explanatory matrix, but also to defend those decisions as being somehow
justified or, at least, “understandable” and making “sense in the context within
which they were rendered.” 74 This justificatory inclusion, albeit begrudgingly
so, is a very high price to pay for explanatory integrity, especially when he labels
such decisions, with understatement, as “not good.”75 The effect of this is to
grant an all-in legitimacy to an adjudicative process that produced these cases
and, as troublingly, all other future cases that might fit within or conform with
“what we now understand,” no matter how objectionable or even abominable
such decisions might be. It is one thing for Lessig to warrant this by noting
that the Supreme Court should not be expected “to spit in the wind of what
we all know is true,”76 but it is surely a stretch too far to condone and justify
such adjudicative handiwork. In avoiding the trap of offering an account of
constitutional doctrine that is a thinly-veiled story of how it all lines up with the
theorist’s own political and moral lights (as Dworkin and others do), it is equally
problematic to offer an account that confers on what is or has been the prized
imprimatur of what should be.
Also, there is something very unsettling about Lessig’s account of why Supreme
Court judges should put role fidelity ahead of meaning fidelity—“correctness
alone is not enough.”77 This leads him to approve a course of judicial action that
involves foregoing “decid[ing] cases correctly”78 if the institutional costs of doing
so are too high: “[C]ourts suffer an institutional cost if their judges behave in
a way that seems political.”79 Apart from seeming to admit that courts do act
politically, he is recommending that courts hide from the public exactly what
they are doing and why. In a democracy, this seems a very dubious notion for
an institution that already has a very suspect legitimacy in society’s eyes. If the
Supreme Court is to earn or reclaim its necessary claim to moral and political
authority, it does not seem advisable to deliberately keep the non-elite public in
the dark. This is a patronizing response and seems to undercut, not undergird,
the Supreme Court’s standing in a scheme of governance animated by democratic
72.
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aspirations and public values. Candour and good faith are surely better than a
closeted dissemblance.
All of this seems to be driven by Lessig’s fear that all will be lost if the
Supreme Court is seen to be, and actually is, acting in a political way. Although
he is in good company in being motivated by such a deep anxiety,80 democracy
will not fall or be irreparably harmed if Supreme Court judges are understood
to be doing something that is inside, not outside the political fray. Ironically,
it might be that an open admission that “the Constitution gets read against the
background of the dominant ideas of any age” that will advance, not impair the
democratic project.81 Citizens might be assured that their views do count and
that the Supreme Court is not only acting in society’s best interest, but also doing
so in a way that respects contemporary society’s views about what is in their best
interests; direct participation by the people is far superior to indirect mediation
by elite actors for the people. This is preferable to a Lessigian-informed scheme
of governance in which its elite institutions rule through professional pretense.
Of course, once the political cat is out of the judicial bag, some changes
will be necessary. This may or may not involve reducing the final authority of
the Supreme Court on constitutional matters82 and/or rejigging the process by
which Supreme Court judges are appointed and hold tenure. However, the real
and neglected issue on the jurisprudential agenda is not the Supreme Court’s lack
of democratic legitimacy and the politicization of courts, but the institutional
failure of other branches of government to address their own democratic foibles
and failings. If governments and legislatures were more truly responsive to
popular concerns and more open to popular participation, the question of what
judges do would be less pressing and more incidental. Consequently, if there
is a crisis in democracy, it is that it is used more as a rhetorical cloak for elitist
governmental practice than as a measure and guide for popular politics. It is present
governmental processes generally, not only judicial review, that fail to satisfy or
even aspire to the demands of genuine democracy. But there is absolutely no
warrant to frame the democratic debate as a zero-sum choice between legislatures
and courts, as presently constituted.
80. Almost all mainstream theorists are so driven. See e.g. Dworkin, supra note 13; Sunstein,
supra note 13; Fallon, supra note 13.
81. Lessig, supra note 2 at 442.
82. See Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton University
Press, 1999); Larry D Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial
Review (Oxford University Press, 2004); Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against
Judicial Review,” (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1346. For my own proposals, see Allan C Hutchinson,
Democracy and Constitutions (A Short Book of Laughter and Forgetting), forthcoming.
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In short, there is a strong case to be made for the creation of multiple possible
veto points in ensuring the fulfilment of important democratic ambitions about
the protection of people’s rights and political entitlements. Lessig’s deference to
“what we now understand” has no democratic valence on its own. While legal
critics and activists must work with the justificatory tools of their society, they
are not condemned to work within its past decisions or remain beholden to its
present orientations. The past consensus is only a starting point and the present
accord is only a temporary respite from continuing debate and engagement;
Lessig acknowledges this, even as he fails to act upon it. As such, extant
democratic arrangements must themselves not only allow, but also encourage and
facilitate critical engagement. Justificatory standards endure only as long as they
retain the confidence and support of the community as the best and most useful
benchmarks available; they thrive and wither in the good-faith debate between
intelligent interlocutors about what counts as “working best.” Lessig would do
well to be more mindful of that.

VI. CONCLUSION
Lessig ends Fidelity and Constraint with a plaintive lament for the present fate of
the Supreme Court. As contemporary politics manages to degrade itself further,
his worry is that this is infecting the workings and prestige of the Supreme Court.
As such, Lessig maintains there is “no guarantee that the practice that [Fidelity
and Constraint] describes can survive.”83 In particular, he frets that the naked
politicization of the Court (for example, in judicial appointments) will mean
that its capacity to transcend partisan politics will be lost and “the effort to keep
alive commitments thought fundamental therefore could [not] flourish.”84 Yet,
if the crux of that Lessigian practice is that “the Constitution gets read against
the background of the dominant ideas of any age,” then, if he is faithful to his
account, it will likely not only accommodate such a shift, but also will judge it
to be acceptable.85 That being the case, he will be left with the uncomfortable
choice of either changing his account of the Supreme Court’s history to give it
a more substantive and “fundamental” tilt and bite or staying with his account
and simply taking what comes. Lessig will be, in a manner of speaking, spitting
into his own wind of constitutional truth in the face of such a political firestorm.

83. Lessig, supra note 2 at 6.
84. Ibid at 458.
85. Ibid 442.

